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INTRODUCTION 
 Lebanese woman wearing a headscarf pulls into a parking space 
outside a sandwich shop in Tulsa, Oklahoma. She exits her 
vehicle and walks toward the restaurant when a man, angered because 
she parked her car too close to his, approaches her. The man begins 
following the woman while repeatedly yelling anti-Muslim slurs at 
her. The woman makes it into the restaurant, but, as she leaves, she 
spots the man kneeling by her car pulling a knife out of a tire. When 
she questions the man, he strikes her in the head while continuing to 
spout antireligious epithets. Local police arrest the man for the 
assault, and Tulsa County prosecutors charge him with three 
misdemeanors. The Tulsa County District Attorney later dismisses the 
state charges without prejudice, and a federal investigation ensues.1 
In 2009, Congress enacted The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, 
Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act (HCPA) to combat crimes like the one 
 
1 Bill Braun, Tulsa County Hate Crime Charge Dismissed in Light of Federal 
Investigation, TULSA WORLD (Mar. 17, 2014, 11:28 PM), http://www.tulsaworld.com 
/homepagelatest/tulsa-county-hate-crime-charge-dismissed-in-light-of-federal/article_b59 
d2ee0-ae55-11e3-b69d-001a4bcf6878.html; see also Rick Couri, Man Accused of 
Religious Hate Crime Against Woman He Believes Is Muslim, KRMG (Jan. 3, 2014, 7:03 
AM), http://www.krmg.com/news/news/local/man-accused-religious-hate-crime-against    
-woman-he-/ncbfx/; Tulsa Police Arrest Stuart Manning, Suspected of Assaulting Woman; 
Suspect Charged with Hate Crime, KJRH (Jan. 3, 2014, 10:38 AM), http://www.kjrh.com 
/news/local-news/tulsa-police-arrest-stuart-manning-suspected-of-assaulting-woman          
-suspect-charged-with-hate-crime. 
A
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described above.2 In an effort to address the inadequacies of current 
state criminal laws to punish and deter such crimes, Congress enacted 
the HCPA to provide a means to federally prosecute—and aid state 
authorities in prosecuting—violent crimes motivated by hatred toward 
the victim or victims.3 In support of the HCPA, Congress found that 
“violence motivated by the actual or perceived race, color, religion, 
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or 
disability of the victim poses a serious national problem.”4 Further, 
Congress noted that hate-motivated violence devastates not just the 
actual victim, but the victim’s family and friends, as well as the larger 
community of people sharing the victim’s targeted traits.5 It was 
Congress’s intent to address the growing incidence of hate crimes 
nationwide by providing federal prosecutors with an effective way to 
punish and eliminate a wide variety of hate-motivated, violent 
criminal activity. 
In enacting the HCPA, Congress expressly intended to combat hate 
crimes targeting people because of their religion.6 The right to freely 
practice and choose one’s religion is deeply rooted in the American 
conscience, and, historically, Americans have strived to preserve that 
right.7 Hate-motivated violence targeting religious groups directly 
threatens victims’ fundamental right to religious freedom. And 
regrettably, bias-motivated violence aimed at people because of their 
religion continues to make up a significant portion of hate crimes 
committed in the United States.8 It is not difficult to see why 
 
2 Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
84, § 4701, 123 Stat. 2835 (2009) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012)). Matthew Shepard 
was brutally murdered in 1998, allegedly because of his sexual orientation. Lisa Kye 
Young Kim, The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Act: The Interplay of 
the Judiciary and Congress in Suspect Classification Analysis, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 
495, 495–96 (2011). That same year, James Byrd, Jr. was beaten, tied to a truck, and 
dragged to his death because he was black. Id. at 496 n.17. These horrific crimes 
galvanized the nation and sparked widespread support for hate crime legislation. Id. at 
496. 
3 § 4702, 123 Stat. at 2835. 
4 Id. § 4702(1), 123 Stat. at 2835. 
5 Id. § 4702(5), 123 Stat. at 2835. 
6 Id. § 4702(1), 123 Stat. at 2835. 
7 See generally Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious 
Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559 (1989) (discussing historical and modern religious 
liberty and freedom in America). 
8 See Latest Hate Crime Statistics: Annual Report Shows Slight Decrease, FED. 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2013 
/november/annual-hate-crime-statistics-show-slight-decease/annual-hate-crime-statistics    
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Congress found it necessary to include religious protection in the 
HCPA.9 
However, Congress’s constitutional authority to federally 
criminalize hate crimes that target religious groups remains in 
question. Specifically, because the HCPA is grounded, in part, on 
Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment authority, there may be a 
deficiency in the protection the HCPA is providing to religious 
groups. An analysis of Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence reveals 
the possibility that not all religions are protected under the 
Amendment.10 As a result, a crime like the one described above may 
be outside the HCPA’s reach, and the perpetrator could escape 
punishment in the federal system. 
This Comment explores the extent to which federal hate crime 
legislation such as the HCPA protects people from bias-motivated 
violence on account of their religion. In doing so, it examines racial 
and religious protection in the context of Thirteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence and federal hate crime legislation. This Comment seeks 
to explain and clarify the relationship between the Thirteenth 
Amendment, religion, and federal hate crime statutes like the HCPA. 
Part I provides a historical background to the HCPA and the 
Thirteenth Amendment. Part II closely examines race and religion in 
the context of the Thirteenth Amendment. As will become evident, 
racial and religious classifications uniquely intersect in Thirteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence. Part III discusses the scope and 
limitations of the HCPA’s ability to protect people from violent 
crimes motivated by hatred toward religion and identifies two 
resulting problems. This Part briefly explores equal protection issues 
that may arise in connection with prosecutions under the HCPA. In 
doing so, it suggests that a portion of the HCPA, as applied, violates 
equal protection principles. Lastly, Part IV discusses three approaches 
to interpreting Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment power and argues 
that the Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress the authority to 
protect people of all religious groups from hate crimes. 
 
-show-slight-decrease (stating that nineteen percent of hate crimes in 2012 targeted 
religious groups). 
9 Congress also included religious protection in another federal hate crime statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B), which makes it unlawful to interfere with “any person because of 
his race, color, religion or national origin” for enjoying a service provided by the State. 18 
U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
10 See infra Part II. 
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I 
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
A. The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes 
Prevention Act 
The HCPA contains two main provisions: §§ 249(a)(1) and 
249(a)(2).11 Congress invoked two different sources of federal power 
to justify each provision.12 Section 249(a)(1), which is this 
Comment’s focus, was justified pursuant to Congress’s Thirteenth 
 
11 Title 18 U.S.C. § 249 reads, in relevant part: 
(a) In general.— 
(1) Offenses involving actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national 
origin.—Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, willfully causes 
bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, a dangerous 
weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, attempts to cause bodily 
injury to any person, because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, 
or national origin of any person— 
(A) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance 
with this title, or both . . . 
(2) Offenses involving actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, 
sexual  orientation, gender identity, or disability.— 
(A) In general.—Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, 
in any circumstance described in subparagraph (B) or paragraph (3), 
willfully causes  bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a 
firearm, a dangerous  weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, 
attempts to cause bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or 
perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or disability of any person— 
(i) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in 
accordance with this title, or both . . . 
(B) Circumstances described.—For purposes of subparagraph (A), the 
circumstances described in this subparagraph are that— 
(i) the conduct described in subparagraph (A) occurs during the 
course of, or as the result of, the travel of the defendant or the 
victim— 
(I) across a State line or national border; or 
(II) using a channel, facility, or instrumentality of interstate 
or foreign commerce; 
(ii) the defendant uses a channel, facility, or instrumentality of 
interstate or foreign commerce in connection with the conduct 
described in subparagraph (A). 
18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1)–(2). 
12 See Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-84, § 4702, 123 Stat. 2835–36 (2009). 
MINTZ (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2015  8:24 AM 
504 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93, 499 
Amendment authority. Section 249(a)(2), on the other hand, is 
predicated on Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. 
Section 249(a)(1) makes it a crime to cause bodily injury to a 
person “because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or 
national origin of any person.”13 This section was justified pursuant to 
the Enabling Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, which gives 
Congress the constitutional authority to govern purely private 
conduct, although within certain parameters.14 In enacting the statute, 
Congress made the following finding: 
For generations, the institutions of slavery and involuntary servitude 
were defined by the race, color, and ancestry of those held in 
bondage. Slavery and involuntary servitude were enforced, both 
prior to and after the adoption of the 13th amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, through widespread public and 
private violence directed at persons because of their race, color, or 
ancestry, or perceived race, color, or ancestry. Accordingly, 
eliminating racially motivated violence is an important means of 
eliminating, to the extent possible, the badges, incidents, and relics 
of slavery and involuntary servitude.15 
As is evident, Congress found the proper authority to enact                 
§ 249(a)(1) in the Thirteenth Amendment and did not deem it 
necessary to act pursuant to the Commerce Clause, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, or any other constitutional power. According to 
Congress, § 249(a)(1) could be justified on Thirteenth Amendment 
grounds because bias-motivated violent crimes on account of race are 
significantly related to the remnants of slavery.16 Additionally, 
Congress found that because certain religious groups were perceived 
as distinct races when the Thirteenth Amendment was adopted, 
assaults on the basis of religion should be prohibited “at least to the 
extent such religions . . . were regarded as races” when the 
Amendment was adopted.17 Thus, § 249(a)(1) may reach purely 
localized hate crimes that target people because of their “race, color, 
religion, or national origin,” provided those groups were perceived as 
races in the 1860s. 
Section 249(a)(2) expands protection to people who are attacked 
because of their “gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or 
 
13 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1). 
14 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439–40 (1968); see also discussion 
throughout. 
15 § 4702(7), 123 Stat. at 2836. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. § 4702(8), 123 Stat. at 2836. 
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disability.”18 Because these classifications are likely outside the scope 
of Thirteenth Amendment protection, Congress sought to rely on its 
Commerce Clause authority to enact § 249(a)(2).19 Congress included 
in § 249(a)(2) an interstate commerce nexus, whereby the defendant’s 
offense must be linked in some way to a channel, facility, or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce.20 By resorting to the 
Commerce Clause, Congress ensured that people subjected to 
violence because of their gender, sexual orientation, or disability were 
protected under § 249(a)(2), provided the offense is linked to 
interstate commerce. 
Much debate surrounds the constitutionality of the HCPA.21 On 
one hand, the HCPA has been lauded as a much needed and lawful 
use of Congress’s ability to legislate criminal conduct.22 When the 
HCPA was enacted, President Barack Obama remarked, “through this 
law, we will strengthen the protections against crimes based on the 
color of your skin, the faith in your heart, or the place of your birth.    
. . . No one in America should be forced to look over their shoulder 
because of who they are.”23 On the other hand, § 249(a)(1) has been 
criticized and challenged as an unconstitutional overextension of 
Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment authority to govern private 
conduct.24 As will become evident, these challenges highlight the 
unsettled nature of Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 
 
18 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2). Congress also repeated religion and national origin in this 
section, likely to cover instances in which a particular religion or national origin is not 
considered a distinct race within Thirteenth Amendment protection. United States v. 
Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1205 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1538 (2014). 
19 See § 4702(6), 123 Stat. at 2835–36. 
20 See 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B). 
21 This Comment’s focus is primarily on § 249(a)(1) and Thirteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence. For a discussion of the constitutionality of § 249(a)(2), see Michael F. 
Pabian, The Hate Crimes Prevention Act: Political Symbol or Prosecutorial Tool?, 48 
CRIM. L. BULL. 347, 356–63 (2012). 
22 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-86, at 5–9 (2009); Brief for the United States as Appellee at 
30–38, United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-2040). 
23 Remarks on the Enactment of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes 
Prevention Act, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1–2 (Oct. 28, 2009), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900859.pdf. 
24 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-86, at 38–46 (2009) (stating the dissenting views); Brief for 
Cato Inst. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Hatch v. United States, cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1538 (2014) (No. 13-6765); Gail Heriot & Alison Schmauch Somin, 
Sleeping Giant?: Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment, Hate Crimes Legislation, and 
Academia’s Favorite New Vehicle for the Expansion of Federal Power, 13 ENGAGE: J. 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 31 (2012). 
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B. The Thirteenth Amendment 
Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment reads, “[n]either slavery 
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof 
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction,” and Section 2 states, 
“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation.”25 
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the Thirteenth Amendment was 
ratified to abolish slavery in the United States.26 And Section 2 of the 
Thirteenth Amendment—the Enabling Clause—gives Congress the 
unique power to enact legislation that effectuates the purpose of 
Section 1: ensuring that slavery never again exists in the United 
States. 
Since the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification, Congress has 
passed civil rights legislation that purports to eliminate the “badges 
and incidents of slavery”27 by prohibiting public and private 
discrimination in various contexts.28 Federal hate crime statutes such 
as the HCPA are among the pieces of legislation Congress has 
justified on Thirteenth Amendment grounds. But the meaning and 
extent of Congress’s legislative power under the Enabling Clause 
continues to be a debated subject in both academia and federal courts. 
Although ratified in the aftermath of the Civil War, the extent of 
Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment power to stamp out slavery and its 
remnants remains evasive and unsettled.29 In particular, whether 
Congress may protect all religious groups from hate crimes pursuant 
to its authority under the Thirteenth Amendment is an unresolved 
issue. 
 
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
26 Id. 
27 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
28 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012) (establishing equal 
rights among races in making contracts); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 
(2012) (establishing equal rights among races in property conveyance); Fair Housing Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (2012) (prohibiting discrimination in real estate transactions); 18 
U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) (2012) (criminalizing hate crimes against victims using public 
facilities); Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 247(c) (2012) (criminalizing 
destruction of religious property on account of associated race, color, or ethnic 
characteristic); Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (discussed throughout). 
29 See Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 561 (2012). 
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Before looking closer at the extent to which the Thirteenth 
Amendment and § 249(a)(1) of the HCPA protect religious groups, it 
is necessary to first examine the Supreme Court’s line of cases 
interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment. Discussing these cases will 
flesh out the origin and contours of Congress’s Thirteenth 
Amendment legislative powers. 
C. Thirteenth Amendment Case Law 
The phrase “badges and incidents of slavery” has become a well-
known mantra for describing and interpreting the boundaries of 
Congress’s power under the Thirteenth Amendment.30 The phrase 
was first used in 1883 by Justice Bradley in the Civil Rights Cases31: 
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment “clothes Congress with 
power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges 
and incidents of slavery in the United States.”32 Since then, in a few 
landmark cases, the Supreme Court has weighed in on the proper 
interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment and Congress’s power to 
abolish the badges and incidents of slavery. These important 
decisions, discussed below, reflect the unique complexities of 
interpreting Congress’s legislative power to ensure that slavery—
whether literal slavery or a “badge” or “incident” of slavery—never 
exists in the United States. 
1. The Civil Rights Cases 
The Civil Rights Cases mark the beginning of the Supreme Court’s 
cases interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment. The Civil Rights Cases 
are five consolidated cases based upon alleged violations of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875.33 Operators of hotels, theaters, and railroads were 
prosecuted in various locations for denying African Americans equal 
use of their facilities.34 The primary question before the Court was 
 
30 Many scholars have hypothesized about the correct interpretation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment and the “badges and incidents of slavery.” See, e.g., William M. Carter, Jr., 
Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges and Incidents of 
Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311 (2007) (advocating for a balanced interpretation of 
the Thirteenth Amendment); McAward, supra note 29 (arguing for a limited definition of 
the “badges and incidents of slavery”); see also infra Part IV. 
31 109 U.S. at 20. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 4. 
34 Id. 
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whether the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was constitutional under the 
Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments.35 
Justice Bradley, writing for the majority, began by dispelling any 
notion that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was constitutional on 
Fourteenth Amendment grounds.36 Justice Bradley found that the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only the denial of equal protection 
by a State, not the denial of equal protection in private conduct.37 
Therefore, the Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 cannot be 
constitutionally sustained under the Fourteenth Amendment because 
the Act targets private discrimination rather than State-induced 
discrimination.38 
The inquiry then turned to the Thirteenth Amendment. Justice 
Bradley explained that the Thirteenth Amendment, unlike the 
Fourteenth Amendment, “is not a mere prohibition of State laws 
establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that 
slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the 
United States.”39 Justice Bradley acknowledged that “Congress has a 
right to enact all necessary and proper laws for the obliteration and 
prevention of slavery, with all its badges and incidents.”40 However, 
Justice Bradley went on to interpret what he meant by “badges and 
incidents of slavery” with a fairly narrow lens. The question for the 
Court, essentially, became “[c]an the act of a mere individual, the 
owner of the inn, the public conveyance, or place of amusement, 
refusing the accommodation [to an African American], be justly 
regarded as imposing any badge of slavery or servitude upon the 
applicant . . . ?”41 
Justice Bradley answered in the negative. The Court found that the 
type of discrimination involved—denying African Americans equal 
accommodations in places of business—did not reflect or amount to a 
badge or incident of slavery.42 Therefore, the Court held that 
Congress could not prohibit such conduct pursuant to the Thirteenth 
 
35 Id. at 8–9. 
36 Id. at 4–19. 
37 Id. at 11. 
38 Id. at 19. 
39 Id. at 20. 
40 Id. at 21. 
41 Id. at 24. 
42 Id. at 25. 
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Amendment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1875 must be held 
unconstitutional.43 
Justice Harlan, in a lone dissent, embraced a more progressive 
view of the badges and incidents of slavery.44 Justice Harlan noted 
that the Thirteenth Amendment does not provide Congress with the 
authority to “regulate the entire body of the civil rights which citizens 
enjoy.”45 However, Justice Harlan clarified that the type of 
discrimination involved in the Civil Rights Cases certainly would 
amount to a “badge of servitude.”46 He further explained: 
[T]he power of Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment is not 
necessarily restricted to legislation against slavery as an institution 
upheld by positive law, but may be exerted to the extent, at least, of 
protecting the liberated race against discrimination, in respect of 
legal rights belonging to freemen, where such discrimination is 
based upon race.47 
Despite Justice Harlan’s broader construal of the badges and incidents 
of slavery, the majority’s narrow interpretation of Congress’s 
legislative powers under the Enabling Clause of the Thirteenth 
Amendment remained in place for many years. 
2. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. and the Expansion of the Badges and 
Incidents of Slavery 
The Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer 
Co.48 marked a new era in Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence.49 
The Jones decision significantly broadened the interpretation of the 
 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
45 Id. at 36. 
46 Id. at 43. 
47 Id. at 37. 
48 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
49 One preceding case decided in 1906 should be noted: Hodges v. United States, 203 
U.S. 1 (1906), overruled in part by Jones, 392 U.S. 409. Hodges severely limited 
Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment power. In striking the convictions of white men for 
harassing African Americans at a lumber manufacturer, the Court held that the United 
States lacked jurisdiction to stop racially motivated discrimination in labor contracts. Id. at 
20. Although the Court noted that the Thirteenth Amendment applies to all races including 
the Chinese, Italian, and Anglo-Saxon “races,” the Court held that Congress may govern 
only the actual condition of slavery, not its badges and incidents. Id. at 17. The Court 
stated, “[I]t was not the intent of the Amendment to denounce every act done to an 
individual which was wrong if done to a free man and yet justified in a condition of 
slavery.” Id. at 19. Hodges, however, was overruled in part by Jones, 392 U.S. at 441–43 
n.78. 
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Thirteenth Amendment and the meaning of “badges and incidents of 
slavery” as determined by the Civil Rights Cases. And, although 
decided more than forty years ago, Jones remains the primary 
authority in Thirteenth Amendment case law. 
In Jones, the petitioner, an African American, filed a complaint in 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri alleging that the 
respondent refused to sell petitioner a home for the sole reason that 
petitioner was African American.50 Relying in part on § 1982 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866,51 the petitioner sought injunctive and other 
relief.52 Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart held that § 1982 
“bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or 
rental of property, and that the statute, thus construed, is a valid 
exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth 
Amendment.”53 
In making this ruling, the Court expounded upon the legislative 
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Court cited the words of 
Senator Trumbull, who introduced the bill in 1866: 
[The Thirteenth Amendment] declared that all persons in the United 
States should be free. This measure is intended to give effect to that 
declaration and secure to all persons within the United States 
practical freedom. There is very little importance in the general 
declaration of abstract truths and principles unless they can be 
carried into effect.54 
The Court went on to find that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 should 
function exactly as its terms suggest—to prohibit all racial 
discrimination in the United States, whether or not under the color of 
law.55 
The Court next turned to the question of whether the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 was a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Thirteenth 
Amendment power.56 In holding that the Act was constitutional, the 
Court squarely addressed how broadly or narrowly Congress’s power 
 
50 Jones, 392 U.S. at 412. 
51 This portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 reads: “[a]ll citizens of the United States 
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens 
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” 42 
U.S.C. § 1982 (2012).  
52 Jones, 392 U.S. at 412. 
53 Id. at 413. 
54 Id. at 431 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
55 Id. at 436. 
56 Id. at 437–38. 
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under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment should be interpreted.57 
The Court stated, “the majority leaders in Congress—who were, after 
all, the authors of the Thirteenth Amendment—had no doubt that its 
Enabling Clause contemplated the sort of positive legislation that was 
embodied in the 1866 Civil Rights Act.”58 Further, the Court cited 
again, and vehemently agreed with, Senator Trumbull’s words 
referencing the Enabling Clause: 
It was for that purpose that the second clause of that amendment 
was adopted, which says that Congress shall have authority, by 
appropriate legislation, to carry into effect the article prohibiting 
slavery. Who is to decide what that appropriate legislation is to be? 
The Congress of the United States; and it is for Congress to adopt 
such appropriate legislation as it may think proper, so that it be a 
means to accomplish the end.59 
The Court concluded that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was a 
legitimate exercise of Congress’s power under Section 2 of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, and Congress has the authority to rationally 
determine what the badges and incidents of slavery are through 
appropriate legislation.60 Private conduct such as denying an African 
American the right to contract could thus be considered a “badge,” 
“incident,” “relic,” or “vestige” of slavery within the meaning of the 
Thirteenth Amendment.61 
In the aftermath of Jones, academic theories regarding the types of 
private conduct Congress could reach pursuant to the Enabling Clause 
became widespread.62 Even if there is no consensus as to the precise 
meaning of the “badges and incidents of slavery,” the Jones decision 
solidified the constitutionality of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment 
authority to enact legislation aimed at maintaining a society free from 
racial discrimination. 
 
57 Id. at 438. 
58 Id. at 439–40. 
59 Id. at 440 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
60 Id. In a 1976 case, Runyon v. McCrary, the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, another 
codified portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, was also constitutional under the 
Thirteenth Amendment. 427 U.S. 160, 178–79 (1976). 
61 Jones, 392 U.S. at 442–43 (using the word “relic” to describe the lingering effects of 
slavery); id. at 441 n.78 (using the word “vestige” to describe the lingering effects of 
slavery); see also McAward, supra note 29, at 592–96 (discussing the meaning of the 
Court in Jones using the words “relic” and “vestige”). 
62 McAward, supra note 29, at 596–97 (listing the variety of injustices scholars have 
proposed Congress should be able to eradicate via the Thirteenth Amendment). 
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3. Post-Jones Thirteenth Amendment Cases 
Two subsequent Supreme Court cases that reaffirmed and 
expanded upon the principles set out in Jones should also be 
mentioned. In the first case, Griffin v. Breckenridge, a group of 
African Americans brought an action under the Klu Klux Klan Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),63 against two white citizens.64 The plaintiffs 
alleged that the two white defendants conspired to assault and detain 
the plaintiffs, thereby depriving them of equal protection, privileges, 
and immunities under the laws of the United States and Mississippi, 
in violation of § 1985(3).65 The issue before the Court was the scope 
and constitutionality of § 1985(3).66 
After citing the Civil Rights Cases and Jones, the Court noted that 
the “varieties of private conduct [the Thirteenth Amendment] may 
make criminally punishable or civilly remediable extend far beyond 
the actual imposition of slavery.”67 The Court concluded that 
Congress was within its authority under the Thirteenth Amendment 
when enacting a statute that created a remedy for African Americans 
who have been victims of racially discriminatory private action.68 
Section 1985(3) was thus held constitutional.69 
The majority in Griffin supplemented the opinion with an 
additional comment pertaining to the classes of people the Thirteenth 
Amendment may protect. The Court alluded to the possibility that the 
Thirteenth Amendment, as exercised through § 1985(3), may protect 
not just races, but other class-based groups. The Court stated, “[t]he 
language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal 
 
63 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) provides, in relevant part: 
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the 
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either 
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the 
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws . . . [and] in any case 
of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, 
or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, 
whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and 
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so 
injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned 
by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators. 
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012). 
64 403 U.S. 88, 89–92 (1971). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 93. 
67 Id. at 105. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or 
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus 
behind the conspirators’ action.”70 
In the second case, McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transportation 
Co.,71 a group of white men brought an action against the men’s 
employer, a transportation company, for wrongfully discharging the 
group, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.72 The white petitioners 
claimed that they were wrongfully dismissed from employment 
because similarly charged black employees were not dismissed.73 The 
issue before the Court was whether § 1981 could apply to 
discrimination against whites.74 The Court held that § 1981 protects 
all races, including whites, from discrimination.75 In doing so, the 
Court cited the decree in Hodges v. United States that Congress’s 
Thirteenth Amendment authority may reach “every race and 
individual.”76 
Jones and the post-Jones cases illuminate a few key tenets of 
Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence. First, it is entirely 
constitutional for Congress to regulate private, racially discriminatory 
conduct pursuant to the Enabling Clause of the Thirteenth 
Amendment. Second, under the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress 
may protect all races from discrimination, not just the African 
American race. And further, there is a possibility, following the 
suggestions in Griffin, that the Thirteenth Amendment’s protection 
may reach not only races, but also other class-based groups.77 
 
70 Id. at 102 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
71 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
72 Id. at 275–78. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 states, in part: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right 
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, 
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for 
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be 
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of 
every kind, and to no other. 
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012). The petitioners also alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 275–78. 
73 McDonald, 427 U.S. at 275–78. 
74 Id. at 276. 
75 Id. at 287–89. 
76 Id. at 288 n.18 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also supra 
note 49. 
77 Two more Supreme Court cases need to be discussed here. In United Brotherhood of 
Carpenters of America & Joiners v. Scott, the Court, reaffirming Griffin, withheld 
affirmative judgment regarding whether § 1985(3) could reach classes other than races, but 
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The next Section explores in more depth the various classes of 
people the Thirteenth Amendment may or may not protect. 
Specifically, Part II examines Congress’s ability to protect religions 
from discriminatory conduct under its Thirteenth Amendment 
authority to abolish the badges and incidents of slavery. 
II 
RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS CLASSIFICATIONS AND THE THIRTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 
Before turning to a discussion of the HCPA and bias-motivated 
hate crimes against religious groups, it is helpful to examine how 
courts have analyzed racial and religious classification in the context 
of the Thirteenth Amendment. Inspecting the unique interplay 
between race and religion is necessary to understand how religion is 
treated in Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 
As explained in Part I, the Supreme Court has held that the African 
American race may be protected under the Thirteenth Amendment.78 
Additionally, Supreme Court precedent indicates that all races fall 
under the Thirteenth Amendment’s protection, not just African 
Americans.79 However, two subsequent Supreme Court cases reveal 
that classifying according to race is not a simple or straightforward 
task. Perhaps due to the blurry lines between racial identity and 
religious identity, the Court has left an imperfect picture regarding 
which class of people Congress may protect under the Thirteenth 
Amendment. 
This Part begins by discussing notions of race-based religious 
protection under the Thirteenth Amendment. Illustrations of two 
Supreme Court cases shed light on how religions came to be 
classified with reference to antiquated notions of race. Then, a 
 
outright declined to hold that § 1985(3) could reach animus targeting economic class. 463 
U.S. 825, 837–38 (1983). And, in Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, the Court 
held that opposition to abortion does not qualify alongside racial discrimination as an 
“otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus,” as required by Griffin, and 
that opposition to abortion does not by itself reflect animus against women in general. 506 
U.S. 263, 268–69 (1993) (citation omitted). While these cases analyzed at length Griffin’s 
proclamation that the Thirteenth Amendment and § 1985(3) could “perhaps” reach classes 
other than races, neither case foreclosed the possibility that there are classes beyond race 
that warrant protection from animus. These two cases merely declined to extend the 
Thirteenth Amendment and § 1985(3)’s protection to animus aimed at economic classes 
and women seeking abortions. 
78 See supra Part I.C. 
79 See supra Part I.C. 
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discussion of circuit court cases highlights the current and unsettled 
state of the law surrounding Thirteenth Amendment religious 
protection. 
A. Saint Francis College, Shaare Tefila Congregation, and Race-
Religions 
In 1987, the Supreme Court handed down two opinions that 
addressed which classes of people could bring an action under 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982.80 Both opinions turned to nineteenth-
century conceptions of race when deciding who could be protected 
under §§ 1981 and 1982.81 These cases eventually became the 
guiding authority for determining which classes of people are 
protected under the Thirteenth Amendment. 
In Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, an Iraqi-born college 
professor brought suit under § 1981 against Saint Francis College for 
denying him tenure.82 Al-Khazraji alleged he was discriminated 
against because of his Arabian ancestry or race.83 The question before 
the court was whether a person of Arabian ancestry could be 
protected from racial discrimination under § 1981.84 
To answer this question, the Court delved into nineteenth-century 
notions of race, drawing from legislative history and nineteenth-
century dictionaries and encyclopedias.85 Rejecting Saint Francis 
College’s argument that Arabs were considered part of the Caucasian 
race both contemporarily and in the nineteenth century, the Court 
explained, “[t]he understanding of ‘race’ in the 19th century . . . was 
different. Plainly, all those who might be deemed Caucasian today 
were not thought to be of the same race at the time § 1981 became 
law.”86 The Court then made explicit findings of various groups that 
were considered races in the nineteenth century, including Arabs.87 
 
80 See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); Shaare Tefila 
Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987). 
81 For a thorough analysis and critique of these decisions, see Jennifer Grace Redmond, 
Redefining Race in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila Congregation 
v. Cobb: Using Dictionaries Instead of the Thirteenth Amendment, 42 VAND. L. REV. 209 
(1989). 
82 481 U.S. at 606. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 607. 
85 See id. at 610–13. 
86 Id. at 610. 
87 Id. at 610–13. 
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For example, in the nineteenth century, certain classes of people—
such as Arabs, Jews, Mexicans, Finns, and Germans—were all 
considered races.88 Further, the Court noted that discrimination based 
on ancestry or ethnic characteristics “is racial discrimination that 
Congress intended § 1981 to forbid, whether or not it would be 
classified as racial in terms of modern scientific theory.”89 The Court 
concluded that because Arabs were part of a distinct ethnic group 
considered a “race” in the nineteenth century, they were among the 
classes of people that could be protected under § 1981 on account of 
their “ancestry or ethnic characteristics.”90 Therefore, Al-Khazraji’s  
§ 1981 action could be sustained.91 
In Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, the reasoning in Saint 
Francis College was extended to encompass discrimination against 
Jews.92 A Jewish congregation and individual members brought an 
action under § 1982 against the defendants for desecrating their 
synagogue.93 At issue was whether Jews could state a claim under  
§ 1982.94 Because the Court had previously held that both §§ 1981 
and 1982 derive from the Civil Rights Act of 1866,95 the Court 
deferred to the same legislative and historical analysis it undertook in 
Saint Francis College: 
[T]he question before us is not whether Jews are considered to be a 
separate race by today’s standards, but whether, at the time § 1982 
was adopted, Jews constituted a group of people that Congress 
intended to protect. It is evident from the legislative history of the 
section reviewed in Saint Francis College, a review that we need 
not repeat here, that Jews and Arabs were among the peoples then 
considered to be distinct races and hence within the protection of 
the statute.96 
The Court held that Jews cannot be foreclosed from bringing a cause 
of action under § 1982, even if Jews are today considered to be part of 
the Caucasian race.97 
 
88 Id. at 611–12. 
89 Id. at 613. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 481 U.S. 615, 616–18 (1987). 
93 Id. at 616. 
94 Id. at 617. 
95 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170–71 (1976). 
96 Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617–18. 
97 Id. at 618. 
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Although neither Saint Francis College nor Shaare Tefila 
Congregation explicitly mentions the Thirteenth Amendment, the 
opinions became legislators’ and judges’ reference points for 
discerning which classes of citizens the Amendment protects.98 The 
reason for this is twofold. First, the Supreme Court has seldom 
addressed this issue. Thus, legislators and judges have had no choice 
but to turn to the next best authority for guidance—the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of statutes passed alongside the Amendment.99  
Second, because §§ 1981 and 1982 were enacted in the wake of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, legislators and judges have found that the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of these statutes could apply to the 
Amendment itself.100 Thus, as the law stands today, Saint Francis 
College and Shaare Tefila Congregation provide at least a general 
guide for discerning which classes of people the Thirteenth 
Amendment protects. 
By harkening back to nineteenth-century notions of race in 
interpreting §§ 1981 and 1982, Saint Francis College and Shaare 
Tefila Congregation created a point of confusion in Thirteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence that still resonates today.101 Because these 
opinions became the reference point for Thirteenth Amendment 
interpretation, religious identity is now understood through a racial 
lens for purposes of Thirteenth Amendment classification. More 
specifically, Shaare Tefila Congregation’s inclusion of Jews in the 
ethnic-racial category produced an irregularity in the protection the 
Thirteenth Amendment provides to religious groups by contemporary 
standards: people of one religion, Judaism, are protected under the 
Thirteenth Amendment, whereas people of many other religious faiths 
may not be. 
But must a religion always be considered a nineteenth-century 
“race” to warrant Thirteenth Amendment protection? The next 
 
98 See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 178 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that 
because §§ 1981 and 1982 were passed in the wake of the Thirteenth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court’s analysis of these statutes may apply, a fortiori, to the Thirteenth 
Amendment itself); 142 CONG. REC. H6451 (daily ed. June 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. 
Hyde) (stating that the Court’s interpretation of §§ 1981 and 1982 applies to the Thirteenth 
Amendment). 
99 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
100 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
101 See generally Molly E. Swartz, By Birth or by Choice? The Intersection of Racial 
and Religious Discrimination in School Admissions, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 229, 232–33 
(2010) (discussing the blurry distinction between race and religion and noting the 
difficulty of classifying “ethnoreligious” groups such as Jews). 
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Section will explore two circuit court opinions that touch upon this 
issue. 
B. Circuit Court Decisions 
Beyond that which can be gleaned from Saint Francis College and 
Shaare Tefila Congregation, the Supreme Court has never addressed 
whether religions may be protected directly under the Thirteenth 
Amendment. However, a few circuit courts have weighed in on the 
matter.102 When addressing religious protection under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, circuit courts have inconsistently applied the Supreme 
Court precedent laid out in Saint Francis College and Shaare Tefila 
Congregation. The key issue is whether Congress may protect 
religions directly under the Thirteenth Amendment, or whether 
Congress may reach only those religions considered races in the 
nineteenth century. 
1. United States v. Nelson 
The Second Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Nelson103 
contains possibly the most expansive reading of Congress’s 
Thirteenth Amendment power to protect classes of people other than 
races, such as religious groups.104 The Nelson decision opened the 
door for the argument that the Thirteenth Amendment’s protection 
reaches all religions directly, without a detour through nineteenth-
century definitions of race. 
In Nelson, two defendants appealed their convictions under 18 
U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B)105 for willfully intimidating and interfering 
 
102 Only a few circuit court decisions, discussed in this Section, specifically address 
whether religions are protected under the Thirteenth Amendment. However, a number of 
circuit courts have analyzed whether federal hate crime statutes, including the HCPA and 
18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B), are constitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment. See, e.g., 
United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, No. 14-5356 (U.S. 
Dec. 1, 2014), 2014 WL 3698394; United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013), 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1538 (2014); United States v. Maybee, 687 F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 
2012); Nelson, 277 F.3d 164; United States v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1984). 
103 Nelson, 277 F.3d 164. 
104 See Carter, supra note 30, at 1358. 
105 The statute makes it unlawful to interfere with “any person because of his race, 
color, religion or national origin” for enjoying a service provided by the State. 18 U.S.C.   
§ 245(b)(2)(B) (2012). This legislation provides an excellent analogy to § 249(a)(1) of the 
HCPA. Section 245(b)(2)(B) criminalizes bias-motivated interference because the victim 
is enjoying a “federally protected activity” such as a service, benefit, or program provided 
by the State. Id. On the other hand, the HCPA does not require that the victim be engaged 
in a federally protected activity; the HCPA reaches bias-motivated violence generally, 
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with a victim because of his Jewish religion.106 The defendants’ 
primary claim was that § 245(b)(2)(B) represents an improper 
extension of Congress’s power under the Constitution.107 The 
government countered, arguing, inter alia, that § 245(b)(2)(B) falls 
squarely within Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment legislative 
authority.108 To reach its decision, the Second Circuit undertook a 
thorough discussion of the constitutionality of § 245(b)(2)(B) and 
Congress’s powers under the Thirteenth Amendment.109 
The court began by analyzing the history and scope of the 
Thirteenth Amendment.110 Following Supreme Court precedent, the 
court determined that the Thirteenth Amendment’s decree abolishing 
slavery in the United States applies equally to all races.111 So, the key 
question for the court became whether Jews are a “race” such that 
they may be afforded protection under the Thirteenth Amendment 
and, consequently, § 245(b)(2)(B).112 
The court held that the Thirteenth Amendment does in fact protect 
Jews, as a race, from discrimination.113 The court explained that 
“‘race’ as used in Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence is a term of 
art, whose meaning is not limited by today’s usage.”114 Then, after 
citing the Saint Francis College and Shaare Tefila Congregation 
interpretations of §§ 1981 and 1982, the Second Circuit noted, 
[T]hese arguments apply, a fortiori, to the Thirteenth Amendment 
itself. For it is on the authority of the Thirteenth Amendment that 
the applications of these civil rights statutes developed. . . . 
Accordingly, we find that Jews were among the “races” intended to 
be protected from slavery and involuntary servitude by the 
 
whether or not the victim is enjoying a federally protected activity. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1). 
Nevertheless, for purposes of Thirteenth Amendment analysis, § 245(b)(2)(B) is a helpful 
comparison to the HCPA, for § 245(b)(2)(B) has been found constitutional on Thirteenth 
Amendment grounds, and § 245(b)(2)(B) and the HCPA protect the same classes of 
people, including religions. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B). 
106 Nelson, 277 F.3d at 168–69. 
107 Id. at 173. 
108 Id. at 174. 
109 Id. at 173–92. 
110 Id. at 175. 
111 Id. at 176. 
112 Id. at 175–77. 
113 Id. at 178. 
114 Id. at 176. 
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Thirteenth Amendment, and that Congress may today protect Jews 
pursuant to that Amendment.115 
Thus, the court’s position was that because Jews were considered a 
race in the nineteenth century when the Thirteenth Amendment was 
adopted, Congress has the power through the Thirteenth Amendment 
to implement statutes such as § 245(b)(2)(B) to protect Jews from 
animus. 
The court, however, did not end its analysis there. Specifically 
rejecting the defendants’ argument that the Thirteenth Amendment 
protects Jews neither as a race nor a religion, the court stated, “there 
is strong precedent to support the conclusion that the Thirteenth 
Amendment extends its protections to religions directly, and thus to 
members of the Jewish religion, without the detour through 
historically changing conceptions of ‘race’ that we have just 
taken.”116 The court based this conclusion on the idea that nothing in 
the conceptual or linguistic notions of slavery and involuntary 
servitude “limit[] the banning of these evils only when they are 
imposed along racial lines.”117 Therefore, “the subjugation of one 
person to another by coercive means” remains the same whether the 
subjugation is done on account of race, religion, or for some other 
reason.118 Accordingly, the Second Circuit found that Jews are 
protected by the Thirteenth Amendment irrespective of whether they 
were considered a race in the nineteenth century, and, further, “the 
Thirteenth Amendment extends its protections against slavery to 
religions as well as to races.”119 
The Second Circuit’s expansive interpretation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment has been met with some criticism. One scholar, Professor 
William M. Carter, Jr., commented, “[t]he most significant problem is 
that the court conflated the Amendment’s prohibition of slavery and 
involuntary servitude with its equally important purpose of 
eliminating the badges and incidents of slavery.”120 In other words, 
simply because someone has suffered “enslavement through physical, 
economic, or legal coercion” does not mean that he “has suffered a 
badge of slavery related to the system of African slavery.”121 Thus, 
 
115 Id. at 178. 
116 Id. at 179. 
117 Id. (citing United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988)). 
118 Id. at 179–80. 
119 Id. at 178 n.14. 
120 Carter, supra note 30, at 1360. 
121 Id. at 1361. 
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the Nelson court’s oversight was the assumption that if the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s prohibition of slavery is race-neutral, so too is its 
prohibition of the legacies of slavery.122 
Nevertheless, the Nelson decision left the door open for the 
interpretation, at least in the Second Circuit, that Congress may 
protect all religions directly under the Thirteenth Amendment. Since 
Nelson, no court has issued a direct ruling on the status of religious 
protection under the Thirteenth Amendment. However, in a recent 
case, United States v. Hatch, the Tenth Circuit adopted a fairly 
restrained approach when interpreting the HCPA and Congress’s 
Thirteenth Amendment authority.123 The court in Hatch stuck closely 
to Supreme Court precedent, neglecting to adopt the broader view that 
the Thirteenth Amendment protects religions directly, as the court did 
in Nelson. 
2. United States v. Hatch 
In Hatch, William Hatch and two friends kidnapped and assaulted 
a mentally-disabled Navajo man in New Mexico.124 The men told the 
victim they were drawing “feathers” and “native pride” on his body 
with a marker, but instead drew satanic and anti-homosexual 
images.125 The men also branded a swastika on the victim’s arm with 
a heated wire.126 The government charged all three men with 
violating § 249(a)(1) of the HCPA for subjecting the victim to 
physical violence on account of his race.127 The defendants argued in 
district court that § 249(a)(1) is unconstitutional.128 This argument 
 
122 See id. Carter adopts a balanced view, in which the Thirteenth Amendment should 
“be interpreted in an evolutionary manner, but with specific regard to the experience of the 
victims of human bondage in the United States (i.e., African Americans) and the 
destructive effects that the system of slavery had upon American society, laws, and 
customs.” Id. at 1312. This view sits somewhere between what he calls the “strict 
textualist” view, which limits the Amendment’s scope to literal slavery, and the 
“expansionist approach,” which applies the badges and incidents of slavery to any 
discrimination suffered by any identifiable group. Id. at 1366. Further discussion of the 
various theories for interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment’s scope can be found infra 
Part IV. 
123 722 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013). 
124 Id. at 1195–96. 
125 Id. at 1195. 
126 Id. at 1195–96. 
127 Id. at 1196. 
128 Id. 
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was rejected.129 William Hatch appealed, and the sole question before 
the Tenth Circuit was the constitutionality of § 249(a)(1) of the 
HCPA.130 
The court presented a comprehensive history of the Thirteenth 
Amendment and the Supreme Court’s case law interpreting the 
“badges and incidents of slavery.”131 Next, the court disposed of the 
defendant’s federalism argument, which claimed that § 249(a)(1) 
amounts to congressional overreach by unconstitutionally intruding 
into matters reserved to states.132 Then, the court turned to the main 
issue: whether § 249(a)(1) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s 
authority under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and Jones.133 
The court began its constitutional analysis by examining the 
“salient characteristic of the victim” being protected by the HCPA.134 
Following the Supreme Court’s Saint Francis College and Shaare 
Tefila Congregation decisions, the court explained that in the 
nineteenth century, certain religious groups and national origins were 
perceived as distinct races.135 In light of this, the HCPA may protect 
religions and national origins “‘at least to the extent such religions or 
 
129 Id.; see United States v. Beebe, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. N.M. 2011), aff’d sub 
nom. United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013). 
130 Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1196. 
131 Id. at 1196–1201; see supra Part I.B–C. 
132 Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1201. The defendant based his federalism argument on a 
synthesis of principles derived from the Tenth Amendment and post-Jones precedent 
pertaining to the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. 
The court, however, noted that it will be up to the Supreme Court to decide whether its 
federalism cases should apply to the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. Moreover, it will also be 
up to the Supreme Court to determine the outer limits of Jones’s rational determination 
standard. Id.; see also United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
No. 14-5356 (U.S. Dec. 1, 2014), 2014 WL 3698394 (holding that § 249(a)(1) is a 
constitutional exercise of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment authority, and rejecting 
defendants’ federalism argument that Congress’s powers illuminated in Jones should be 
restricted in light of recent Supreme Court decisions relating to the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments). 
133 Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1205. The court also considered an equal protection challenge to 
the HCPA, discussed infra Part III.A. 
134 Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1205. For this portion of its constitutional analysis, the court 
focused on three considerations: “(1) the salient characteristic of the victim, (2) the state of 
mind of the person subjecting the victim to some prohibited conduct, and (3) the 
prohibited conduct itself.” Id. According to the court, if Congress satisfactorily took into 
account all three considerations, the HCPA would be deemed constitutional pursuant to 
Congress’s Section 2 Thirteenth Amendment authority to rationally determine the badges 
and incidents of slavery. Id. Although not spelled out in case law, the court had “no trouble 
endorsing this approach as a means to rationally determine the badges and incidents of 
slavery.” Id. at 1206. 
135 Id. at 1205. 
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national origins were regarded as races’ in the 1860s.”136 The court 
concluded that Congress extended § 249(a)(1)’s protection to only 
those groups considered races in the nineteenth century when the 
Thirteenth Amendment was adopted.137 Furthermore, Congress was 
within the boundaries of the Thirteenth Amendment when enacting  
§ 249(a)(1) with this limited reach.138 
The Hatch ruling justified § 249(a)(1)’s constitutionality on fairly 
narrow grounds. Unlike Nelson, the court in Hatch chose not to make 
broader, sweeping comments regarding Thirteenth Amendment racial 
and religious classification. This is likely because the targeted trait 
was the victim’s racial ancestry, rather than the victim’s religion, and 
therefore the court did not need to comment extensively on religious 
protection. The court explained, “[w]hile facially broad, the Jones 
formulation supports the narrower approach Congress took in the 
racial violence provision—and we need not speculate on whether a 
broader criminalization of conduct under this rationale would pass 
constitutional review.”139 Thus, the court ended its inquiry into the 
Thirteenth Amendment once it found constitutional justification for  
§ 249(a)(1). 
Although the Hatch decision was limited to this narrow analysis, 
the case makes evident that Thirteenth Amendment religious 
protection continues to be evaluated by referencing nineteenth-
century notions of race. The court in Hatch was comfortable defining 
the HCPA’s religious protection in terms of nineteenth-century race-
religions, whereas the court in Nelson went further, finding that          
§ 245(b)(2)(B) could simultaneously protect religions directly and be 
valid under the Thirteenth Amendment. 
The Nelson and Hatch decisions exemplify two alternate ways to 
interpret Congress’s ability to protect religions pursuant to the 
Thirteenth Amendment. Following Nelson, all religions may be 
protected by statutes justified on Thirteenth Amendment grounds. 
Following the more limited reasoning in Hatch, only those religions 
considered races in the nineteenth century are protected by the 
Thirteenth Amendment. Without further guidance from the Supreme 
Court, the status of religious protection under the Thirteenth 
 
136 Id. (quoting Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 4702(8), 123 Stat. 2836 (2009)). 
137 Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1206. 
138 Id. 
139 Id.  
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Amendment will remain caught between these two possible 
interpretations. 
The next Part turns to a discussion of religion and the HCPA. How 
does the current inconclusive state of the law affect the HCPA’s 
ability to protect religious groups from hate-motivated violence? 
What are the consequences of a statute that on its face protects the 
“religion” of “any person,” but in reality may be protecting only 
select religions? 
III 
RELIGION AND THE HCPA 
As the law currently stands, Judaism is the only religion that has 
been formally recognized as protected by the Thirteenth 
Amendment.140 As such, § 249(a)(1) of the HCPA likely cannot 
protect religious groups other than Jews against hate crimes, unless 
the religious group was considered a race in the nineteenth century.141 
Yet the statutory text of § 249(a)(1) indicates that the HCPA 
protects “any person” from bias-motivated violence on account of his 
or her “religion.”142 The plain language of the statute, then, is 
misaligned with the protection the HCPA is providing. This 
inconsistency illuminates a few problems. First, the HCPA violates 
equal protection principles because the provision as applied makes 
distinctions based on religion. Although the HCPA has been 
challenged for its alleged unequal protection of races,143 no court has 
addressed an equal protection challenge based on the HCPA’s 
unequal protection of religions.144 Second, there is a real possibility 
that many hate crimes against religious groups could go unpunished 
in federal court. If the HCPA is limited to protecting only nineteenth-
century race-religions, then religious groups other than Jews, or any 
religion not deemed a race in the nineteenth century, are simply not 
 
140 See United States v. Allen, 341 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding 18 U.S.C.             
§ 245(b)(2)(B) constitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment and applying it to a crime 
against Jews); United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
Thirteenth Amendment protects Jews). 
141 Pabian, supra note 21, at 355–56. 
142 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (2012). 
143 See infra Part III.A. 
144 At the time of publication of this Comment, research did not reveal any cases in 
which the HCPA’s constitutionality was challenged based on its unequal protection of 
religions. 
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protected by the HCPA.145 This gap in the HCPA’s protection creates 
the perception of inequality in the public eye, which is problematic. 
These two problems will each be discussed in turn. 
A. Problem 1: The HCPA and Equal Protection of Religion 
Due to the irregularity in the HCPA’s protection of religions, the 
statute is vulnerable to an equal protection challenge. Three circuit 
courts have addressed the constitutionality of § 249(a)(1) of the 
HCPA,146 but only one court confronted an equal protection 
challenge.147 That court was the Tenth Circuit in Hatch, which 
specifically rejected the defendant’s argument that the HCPA violated 
equal protection principles.148 However, in Hatch, the defendant’s 
equal protection argument was limited to a criticism of the HCPA’s 
alleged unequal protection of races.149 The defendant claimed that the 
HCPA, as applied through the Thirteenth Amendment, violates equal 
protection principles because it protects only formerly enslaved 
races—rather than all races—and therefore makes distinctions based 
on race.150 But that argument was significantly weakened because, as 
the court explained, “the Thirteenth Amendment protects all races, 
not just those that had been subject to slavery in the United States.”151 
Thus, the court concluded that the HCPA does not in fact make 
 
145 Some hate crimes against religions could be prosecuted by federal authorities under 
§ 249(a)(2), the portion of the HCPA enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. See supra 
note 18 and accompanying text. Of course, the crime would have to be linked in some way 
to a channel, facility, or instrument of interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2). 
146 See United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, No. 14-
5356 (U.S. Dec. 1, 2014), 2014 WL 3698394 (holding that § 249(a)(1) is a constitutional 
exercise of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment authority to rationally define the badges 
and incidents of slavery, and rejecting defendants’ federalism argument that Congress’s 
powers illuminated in Jones should be restricted in light of recent Supreme Court 
decisions relating to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments); United States v. Hatch, 
722 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1538 (2014) (discussed 
throughout); United States v. Maybee, 687 F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that            
§ 249(a)(1) is constitutional even without a requirement that the willful infliction of injury 
be motivated both by the victim’s race and by the victim’s enjoyment of a public benefit, 
as distinguished from 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B)). 
147 Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1208. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 1208–09. 
151 Id. at 1208 (referencing the finding in Hodges v. United States that the Thirteenth 
Amendment protects all races). 
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distinctions based on race.152 Further, the court stated that even if the 
Thirteenth Amendment was limited to protecting formerly enslaved 
races, the HCPA would have no equal protection problem because 
such a limitation is the very sort of legislation the Thirteenth 
Amendment authorizes.153 And finally, the court noted that even if 
the Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to supersede the 
Thirteenth Amendment, the HCPA still would not violate equal 
protection principles because the HCPA’s protection extends to “‘any 
person,’” not just formerly enslaved races.154 
However, a challenge to the HCPA’s unequal protection of all 
religions presents a more forceful equal protection argument. A 
litigant could argue that the HCPA makes distinctions based on 
religion because it protects only those religions regarded as races in 
the nineteenth century. Because not all religions are considered 
nineteenth-century races, the HCPA’s application necessitates 
religion-based classification. The effect of this classification is that 
the HCPA provides hate crime protection to some religious groups, 
such as Jews, while leaving others unprotected.155 As a result, the 
HCPA fails to provide uniform, equal protection to all religious 
groups and should be subject to judicial review for violating 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection principles.156 
If confronted with such an equal protection challenge, a court 
would have to determine the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny. A 
legislative classification receives strict judicial scrutiny when the 
classification interferes with a fundamental right or when it 
disadvantages a suspect class.157 A suspect class is a class that is 
“saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of 
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from 
the majoritarian political process.”158 If a court finds that a suspect 
class is involved and that it must therefore apply strict scrutiny, then 
 
152 Id. at 1208–09. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 1209. 
155 Jews may be considered “ethnoreligious,” i.e., a group that identifies as both ethnic 
and religious. Swartz, supra note 101, at 247–48. However, throughout recent history, 
Jews have identified more and more as a religious group. Id. at 249–50. 
156 The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection principles into federal laws. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
157 Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). 
158 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
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the law in question must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
government interest.159 
It is quite possible that a court would review the HCPA with strict 
scrutiny in a religion-based equal protection challenge. Although the 
Supreme Court has yet to explicitly recognize that Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection principles apply to religions, and has 
instead relied on the First Amendment to decide religion-related 
cases, a law that classifies according to religion may still warrant 
strict scrutiny.160 Abundant historical evidence suggests that religion 
should be treated as a suspect class alongside race.161 Moreover, in 
the well-known footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products 
Co., in which the Supreme Court first considered heightened judicial 
scrutiny for suspect classes, religion was included alongside race as a 
suspect category.162 Thus, it is certainly possible that if presented 
with a religion-based equal protection challenge, a court would 
review the legislation with strict scrutiny.163 
Predicting whether the HCPA would survive strict scrutiny in a 
religion-based equal protection challenge, however, is difficult. On 
one hand, a court may find that the HCPA survives strict scrutiny as a 
narrowly tailored law that serves a compelling government interest. 
Combating and eradicating violence and hatred toward minority 
groups is likely to be considered a compelling government interest 
because, as noted by Congress, America’s history includes incidences 
of hate crimes aimed at people because of their race or religion.164 It 
therefore follows that protecting the public from hate crimes is a 
compelling government interest. Additionally, the HCPA may be 
 
159 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
160 See Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: 
Why the Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FLA. L. REV. 909, 911, 918–19 
(2013). 
161 Id. at 965–70 (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class legislation and 
arguing that historical evidence and legislative history indicates the framers intended for 
the ban on class legislation to include races and religions alike). 
162 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938); see also 
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (listing religion as an inherently 
suspect distinction). 
163 If it was concluded that religions are not a suspect class, a court would scrutinize the 
HCPA under a more relaxed judicial standard, such as rational basis review. Additionally, 
a court might use rational basis review by analyzing the HCPA’s religion-based 
classification under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. In any event, this Comment limits its inquiry of the HCPA’s constitutionality to 
a strict scrutiny analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
164 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-86, at 5 (2009). 
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considered narrowly tailored because the law protects every class that 
Congress can reach under the present interpretation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.165 In other words, the HCPA is narrowly tailored 
because its religion-based distinctions are authorized by the 
Thirteenth Amendment itself. Moreover, it could be argued that the 
HCPA’s religion-based classification is not problematic because 
Congress, of course, has an interest in enacting laws that are 
consistent with the Constitution. 
On the other hand, perhaps the HCPA does not serve a compelling 
government interest, is not narrowly tailored, and would not survive 
strict scrutiny. Some argue that federal hate crime legislation is 
unnecessary because states already sufficiently punish violent crimes, 
and, further, by enacting and enforcing federal hate crime legislation, 
the federal government unlawfully intrudes into the domain of the 
states.166 In this way, criminalizing hate crimes by federal prosecution 
is not a compelling government interest. Additionally, assuming the 
federal government does have an interest in protecting the public from 
hate crimes, perhaps the HCPA is not narrowly tailored; the law does 
not protect all religious groups from hate crimes and, therefore, fails 
to meet an essential aspect of the government’s goal of eradicating 
hatred and violence toward minority groups. 
However, a traditional means-ends inquiry may not be the most 
appropriate way to analyze whether the HCPA violates equal 
protection principles. The HCPA presents a unique conundrum 
because its equal protection problem arises neither from deliberate 
congressional animus nor from a classification drafted into the law; 
rather, the equal protection problem stems from the constitutional 
authority under which the HCPA was enacted. Put differently, the 
HCPA infringes equal protection principles because the current 
interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, as applied through the 
HCPA, allows for unequal treatment of religious groups. 
 
165 Legislative history indicates that Congress intended the HCPA’s protection to 
mirror the protections granted by the Thirteenth Amendment. Matthew Shepard and James 
Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 4702, 123 Stat. 2835–36 
(2009). 
166 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-86, at 40–41 (2009) (in which the dissenters argue that there 
is no justification for the HCPA because states traditionally regulate violent criminal 
activity); Brief for Cato Inst. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Hatch v. United 
States, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1538 (2014) (No. 13-6765) (arguing that states adequately 
prosecute crimes covered by the HCPA, and that the HCPA violates double jeopardy); see 
also Kami Chavis Simmons, Subverting Symbolism: The Matthew Shepard and James 
Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act and Cooperative Federalism, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1863, 1884–87 (summarizing criticisms of the “overfederalization” of criminal law). 
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But how can a law that is consistent with the prevailing 
interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment violate the Equal 
Protection Clause? The answer is simple: the HCPA is predicated on 
a flawed interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment that conflicts 
with the Fourteenth Amendment’s legal protections. Because the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified years after the Thirteenth 
Amendment,167 the Fourteenth Amendment’s legal guarantees must 
qualify and supersede any interpretation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment that allows for religion-based classification or, in other 
words, allows for a breach of equal protection principles. The 
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection decree should be 
understood as an independent principle that qualifies the Thirteenth 
Amendment. Although the HCPA’s application mirrors the present 
interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, the law still violates 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection principles. 
While it may be true that “the legal guarantee of equal protection is 
not a supraconstitutional principle by which the Constitution itself is 
judged,”168 the Constitution—in this case, the Thirteenth 
Amendment—must be interpreted in a way that is consistent with 
subsequent amendments. Although the court in Hatch rejected the 
argument that the Fourteenth Amendment supersedes the Thirteenth 
Amendment and thereby subjects the HCPA to an equal protection 
violation, the court’s analysis considered only the HCPA’s alleged 
unequal protection of races. Importantly, the court explained that 
because the HCPA does not actually draw race-based distinctions, 
there could be no equal protection violation. By contrast, the HCPA 
does draw distinctions based on religion. This changes the equal 
protection inquiry in a dispositive way and may push a court to hold 
not only that the Fourteenth Amendment must qualify the Thirteenth 
Amendment, but that the HCPA infringes equal protection principles 
for allowing arbitrary religion-based distinctions. 
Finally, the fact that the HCPA’s statutory language states that the 
law protects “any person” from hate crimes on account of their 
“religion” does not change the conclusion that the HCPA runs afoul 
of equal protection principles. The court in Hatch refuted the 
argument that the Fourteenth Amendment supersedes the Thirteenth 
 
167 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (ratified in 1865); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (ratified 
in 1868). 
168 United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1208 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 1538 (2014). 
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Amendment by stating that the HCPA does not limit its protection to 
formerly enslaved races, but protects “any person.” But the same 
cannot be said of the HCPA’s protection of religious groups. The 
reality is that despite its inclusive statutory language, the HCPA, 
under the current interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, does 
not protect all religious groups. The legislative history makes clear 
that Congress explicitly limited the HCPA’s protection of religions to 
include only religions considered races in the nineteenth century.169 
Thus, the HCPA’s wide-ranging statutory language fails to save the 
law from an equal protection violation. 
In sum, the HCPA violates equal protection principles because its 
application incorporates an interpretation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment that conflicts with the legal guarantees the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides. Currently, the HCPA is protecting one class of 
people (i.e., Jews) within a given category (religion) while denying 
protection to other classes of people (other religions) within that same 
category (religion). For this reason, the HCPA’s application violates 
equal protection principles. If the HCPA is ever challenged on this 
basis, it is in danger of being deemed unconstitutional. 
B. Problem 2: Unpunished Federal Hate Crimes and the Perception 
of Inequality 
The next problem arises out of policy concerns. If the Thirteenth 
Amendment is limited to protecting only nineteenth-century race-
religions, and § 249(a)(1) of the HCPA too is so limited, then a 
localized violent hate crime committed because the victim was a 
Muslim, or a Mormon, or a Catholic, will go unpunished in federal 
court. Yet, the same crime committed because the victim is Jewish is 
prosecutable under the HCPA. If the nation is truly committed to 
punishing bias-motivated violence on account of religion, then a 
statute that, by its language, punishes crimes against religious groups 
should do just that. Otherwise, the HCPA may be nothing more than a 
feel-good “political symbol.”170 
Because the HCPA’s statutory language is misaligned with its 
actual ability to protect all religions equally, a perception of 
inequality is created in the public eye. Americans should be free to 
live in a country without the fear that they will be attacked or 
discriminated against because of their religion. Additionally, 
 
169 See § 4702(8), 123 Stat. at 2836. 
170 Pabian, supra note 21. 
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Americans should feel comfortable knowing this freedom is being 
protected equally and is not compromised by a legal ambiguity. If the 
Thirteenth Amendment can serve to eradicate the badges and 
incidents of slavery against one religion, the public should not be led 
to believe that a law passed under its authority is not protecting other 
religions on an equal footing. The nation has an interest in 
maintaining laws that provide uniform, equal protection within a 
given class; the nation also has an interest in keeping the public 
appropriately informed of this important safeguard. The HCPA 
should not represent an obstacle to preserving these interests. 
IV 
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT SHOULD PROTECT ALL RELIGIOUS 
GROUPS FROM HATE CRIMES 
Given the unsatisfactory state of Thirteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence and religious protection, this Comment proposes that 
Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment power to abolish the badges and 
incidents of slavery should include the power to protect all religious 
groups equally from hate crimes via statutes like the HCPA. 
Whether Congress may protect all religions under the Thirteenth 
Amendment revolves around this question: does the meaning of the 
“badges and incidents of slavery” extend to religious groups? In the 
hate crime context, if a bias-motivated crime on account of religion 
can be considered a badge, incident, relic, or vestige of slavery, then 
Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment’s Enabling 
Clause to enact laws that target such crimes. If not, then religious 
protection has no place in hate crime statutes that are justified on 
Thirteenth Amendment grounds. 
A. Three Approaches Regarding the Scope of the Badges and 
Incidents of Slavery 
There is no shortage of scholarly debate regarding the extent of 
Congress’s Section 2 Enabling Clause power to abolish the badges 
and incidents of slavery. This debate can be distilled, more or less, 
into three main approaches: the broad approach, the restrictive 
approach, and the “prophylactic” or middle approach.171 
 
171 See Jennifer Mason McAward, The Scope of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment 
Enforcement Power After City of Boerne v. Flores, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 77, 130–47 
(2010). 
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1. The Broad Approach 
The broad approach essentially mirrors the Jones decision.172 
Under the broad approach, scholars argue that Section 2 of the 
Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress expansive powers to 
rationally define the “badges and incidents of slavery.”173 With these 
expansive powers, Congress may enact a wide variety of civil rights 
legislation aimed at maintaining a society free from discrimination by 
providing equal rights to all citizens.174 Because abolishing the 
badges and incidents of slavery is a sufficiently ambiguous concept, 
Congress may interpret its meaning to include the power to enact laws 
combating discrimination.175 
The broad approach would likely give Congress the power to 
protect not only races but other class-based groups, including 
religions, under the Thirteenth Amendment. Under the broad 
approach, Congress could, theoretically, determine that hate crimes 
against religions amount to a badge or incident of slavery, and then 
legislate accordingly. After all, under Jones, Congress itself may 
rationally determine what are the badges and incidents of slavery. 
2. The Restrictive Approach 
Under the restrictive approach, Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment 
authority would be limited to eradicating literal American 
institutionalized slavery.176 Thirteenth Amendment legislation would 
need to be concretely linked to the goal of eradicating actual slavery 
and involuntary servitude.177 Congress would not be permitted to 
legislate toward the goal of abolishing the badges and incidents of 
slavery.178 This approach would effectively eliminate Congress’s 
powers as laid out in Jones.179 
 
172 Id. at 134. 
173 Id. at 134–35; see also Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: 
Modern Slavery and a Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981 
(2002); Alexander Tsesis, Interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
1337 (2009); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last!: Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 90 B.U. L. REV. 255 (2010). 
174 See Alexander Tsesis, Congressional Authority to Interpret the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 71 MD. L. REV. 40, 49–50 (2011). 
175 McAward, supra note 171, at 135. 
176 Id. at 130–34. 
177 Id. at 130–31. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 134. 
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The restrictive approach would prohibit Congress from justifying 
any form of hate crime legislation on the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Hate crimes would be considered wholly unconnected to slavery or 
involuntary servitude, and, as such, Congress would have no 
legislative power to protect either races or religions from hate crimes. 
However, the restrictive approach runs contrary to many Supreme 
Court cases that give Congress power to legislate regarding the 
badges and incidents of slavery.180 Further, historical records indicate 
that “a broader view of Section 2 prevailed among members of 
Congress.”181 Thus, the restrictive approach does not necessarily 
comport with predominant opinions of the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
application. 
3. The “Prophylactic” or Middle Approach 
The “prophylactic” approach represents the middle ground. Under 
the prophylactic approach, Congress could pass legislation with the 
goal of eradicating literal slavery, as well as “prophylactic legislation” 
aimed at abolishing the badges and incidents of slavery.182 Such 
prophylactic legislation would need to be tied closely to the slavery 
system and its aftermath, which would thereby limit Congress’s 
Section 2 power.183 The prophylactic approach would revise Jones by 
preventing Congress from using “the Thirteenth Amendment as a 
source of federal power to enact wide-ranging civil rights protections 
unconnected to the legacy of slavery.”184 Thus, with the prophylactic 
approach, Congress would not have a blank check to interpret the 
badges and incidents of slavery as under the broad approach; 
however, Congress’s legislative powers would not be as severely 
limited as under the restrictive approach. 
Although the prophylactic approach requires a tight nexus between 
the legacy of slavery and Thirteenth Amendment legislation, this 
requirement would not necessarily preclude religious groups from 
Thirteenth Amendment protection.185 It is true that Congress’s ability 
 
180 Id. at 133–34. 
181 Id. at 133. 
182 Id. at 142. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Professor Jennifer Mason McAward expresses skepticism that minority groups other 
than African Americans could be protected under a middle-ground approach to Congress’s 
Section 2 Thirteenth Amendment authority. See id. at 143. On the other hand, Carter has 
suggested that, even under a more middle-ground approach to interpreting the badges and 
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to protect non-race-based classes may be reduced under the 
prophylactic approach. However, as will be discussed below, there is 
a sufficiently tight nexus between the legacy of slavery and hate 
crime legislation aimed at protecting religious groups.186 Thus, 
Congress could still protect religious groups from hate crimes 
pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment under a middle-ground 
approach. 
B. The Badges and Incidents of Slavery Encompasses Hate Crimes 
Aimed at Religious Groups 
This Comment proposes that Congress’s Section 2 Thirteenth 
Amendment power, under either a broad or prophylactic approach,187 
includes the ability to enact criminal statutes that punish violence 
motivated by hatred toward all religions. Set forth below are a few 
key reasons why hate crimes that target any religious group may be 
considered a badge or incident of slavery. 
First, the fact that many religious groups were never subjected to 
institutionalized American slavery does not preclude them from 
Thirteenth Amendment protection. As Supreme Court decisions 
indicate, the meaning of the badges and incidents of slavery is not 
limited to include only classes of people who were victims of 
institutionalized slavery in America. The Thirteenth Amendment 
protects African Americans, who were the victims of American 
slavery, as well as other races that were never subjected to slavery.188 
Further, the Supreme Court has left open the possibility that certain 
class-based groups other than races may be included within the 
 
incidents of slavery, Congress could protect religion-based classes, particularly Muslims, 
from hate crimes and racial or religious profiling. Carter, supra note 30, at 1369–74. I am 
convinced that even under a middle-ground approach to defining the badges and incidents 
of slavery, certain non-race-based classes, such as religion-based classes, may still be 
included within the Thirteenth Amendment’s protection, particularly in the hate crime 
context. 
186 See infra Part IV.B. 
187 As explained above, the restrictive approach is out of sync with current case law, 
and it is well settled that Congress has the authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to 
enact legislation aimed at eradicating not only literal American slavery, but the badges and 
incidents of slavery as well. McAward, supra note 171, at 133–34. Therefore, further 
discussion of the restrictive approach is unnecessary. 
188 See McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287–89, 295 (1976) 
(holding that the Thirteenth Amendment, as exercised through § 1981, protects all races, 
including Caucasians). 
MINTZ (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2015  8:24 AM 
2014] The Thirteenth Amendment and the Hate Crimes Prevention Act: 535 
Is There Room for Religion? 
Thirteenth Amendment’s protection.189 Therefore, it is possible for 
religious groups to be included within the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
protection—this is particularly true in the hate crime context, in 
which remnants of slavery’s legacy may be summoned in a profound 
way. 
Second, crimes motivated by hatred toward both races and 
religions summon vestiges of slavery-like attitudes. Hate crimes 
against races and religions alike invoke oppression, animus, and 
stigmatization of an outcast or minority group. In this way, crimes 
against races are not a far cry from crimes against religious groups. 
Crimes committed because the victim was Jewish, Navajo, or Arab—
all categories that are considered “races” under the Thirteenth 
Amendment—invoke similar slavery-like conditions as crimes 
committed because the victim is Muslim, Mormon, or any another 
religion. Animus toward religious groups thwarts the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s goal, as articulated by Senator Trumbull in 1866, of 
ensuring equal rights to all citizens by maintaining a society free from 
discrimination.190 Consequently, hate crime statutes protecting 
religious groups further the goal of abolishing the badges and 
incidents of slavery in the same way that hate crime statutes 
protecting the races do. 
Lastly, religion, like race, is a classification that warrants 
heightened protection from animus and discrimination. Although the 
Supreme Court has not formerly recognized religion as a suspect class 
warranting strict scrutiny judicial analysis, historical evidence 
suggests that religion is frequently placed alongside race and deserves 
heightened legal protection.191 Therefore, it is reasonable to consider 
religions alongside races for purposes of Thirteenth Amendment 
classification, especially if eradicating the badges and incidents of 
slavery provides Congress with a broad power to ensure equal rights 
for all. 
The law should be updated to allow Congress to protect all 
religions equally under the Thirteenth Amendment. Violent crimes 
based on hatred toward religion—whichever religion—invoke 
slavery-like attitudes, the remnants of which should be abolished from 
 
189 See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-05 (1971) (suggesting that the 
Thirteenth Amendment, as exercised through § 1985(3), may protect against animus 
toward racial “or perhaps otherwise class-based” groups). 
190 Tsesis, supra note 173, at 48–51. 
191 See Calabresi & Salander, supra note 160, at 993–94. 
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the nation. Moreover, if the Thirteenth Amendment continues to be 
interpreted in a way that provides protection to some religions but 
denies protection to many others, then the HCPA will remain in 
violation of equal protection principles. The HCPA cannot truly live 
up to its goal and language until the Thirteenth Amendment is 
reinterpreted to provide Congress with power to protect people of all 
religions from hate-motivated violence. 
CONCLUSION 
The extent of Congress’s ability to utilize the Thirteenth 
Amendment to ensure an end to the badges, incidents, relics, and 
vestiges of slavery is still a point of disagreement in the legal 
community. Some interpret the Thirteenth Amendment as giving 
Congress broad legislative powers, while others are wary of 
congressional overreach. Although praiseworthy legislation,               
§ 249(a)(1) of the HCPA is at the center of this murky area of law. 
The status of religious protection under hate crime statutes like the 
HCPA is intertwined with the boundaries of Congress’s Thirteenth 
Amendment legislative power. Because these boundaries have not 
been clearly delineated, protection of religions under the Thirteenth 
Amendment and the HCPA remains an unsettled issue. Moreover, 
because the current interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment 
allows for unequal treatment of religious groups, the HCPA as 
applied violates core equal protection principles. Currently, localized 
hate crimes against many people because of their religion are likely 
not prosecutable under § 249(a)(1) of the HCPA, despite the statutory 
language indicating otherwise. Consequently, perpetrators of 
horrendous crimes similar to the one described at the outset of this 
Comment may escape punishment in federal court.192 
In light of Nelson’s anomalistic interpretation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, as well as the unsatisfactory implications for the 
protection of religions that stem from Saint Francis College and 
Shaare Tefilah Congregation, the Supreme Court should take the next 
opportunity to update its Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Unfortunately, the Court recently bypassed two such opportunities by 
denying certiorari in two cases that challenged the HCPA’s 
 
192 In that case, federal charges were eventually abandoned, and Tulsa County 
prosecutors reinstated State charges. Skyler Cooper, Charges Re-Filed in Tulsa Hate 
Crime Case, KRMG (Apr. 29, 2014, 4:36 PM), http://www.krmg.com/news/news/local 
/charges-re-filed-tulsa-hate-crime-case/nfknF/. 
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constitutionality: United States v. Hatch and United States v. 
Cannon.193 Although these cases involved an assault on account of 
the victim’s race rather than religion, both cases presented an 
appropriate circumstance for the Supreme Court to rule on Congress’s 
Thirteenth Amendment power, especially in light of federalism 
principles, double jeopardy concerns, and the confused state of 
Thirteenth Amendment case law.194 If the Supreme Court is ever 
presented with another constitutional challenge to § 249(a)(1) of the 
HCPA—particularly if the challenge involves a hate crime motivated 
by animus toward religion—the Court should seize the opportunity to 
clarify what exactly it means for Congress to have the power to 
abolish the badges and incidents of slavery. The extent of Congress’s 
Thirteenth Amendment authority is, after all, still ripe for 
interpretation. 
 
  
 
193 See United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, No. 14-
5356 (U.S. Dec. 1, 2014), 2014 WL 3698394; United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193 (10th 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1538 (2014). 
194 See Brief for Cato Inst. et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Cannon v. 
United States, No. 14-5356 (U.S. Dec. 1, 2014), 2014 WL 3698394; Brief for The Center 
for Equal Opportunity as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Cannon v. United States, 
No. 14-5356 (U.S. Dec. 1, 2014), 2014 WL 3698394; Brief for Cato Inst. et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Hatch v. United States, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1538 (2014) 
(No. 13-6765). 
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